The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values which load a (...) theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue, but is also social, political, and historical. (shrink)

We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: -CA0 (...) (second-order number theory with a -comprehension axiom scheme) is insufficient. We briefly consider his claim to have produced a solution to the semantic paradoxes by introducing this conditional. We remark that the notion of a operator can be introduced in other settings. (shrink)

forall x: Calgary is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity of arguments, the syntax of truth-functional propositional logic TFL and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic FOL with identity (first-order interpretations), symbolizing English in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as modal logic, soundness, and functional completeness. Exercises with solutions are available. (...) It is provided in PDF (for screen reading, printing, and a special version for dyslexics), HTML, and in LaTeX source code. (shrink)

This discussion note addresses Caleb Hazelwood’s ‘Practice-Centered Pluralism and a Disjunctive Theory of Art’. Hazelwood advances a disjunctive definition of art on the basis of an analogy with species concept pluralism in the philosophy of biology. We recognize the analogy between species and art, we applaud attention to practice, and we are bullish on pluralism—but it is a mistake to take these as the basis for a disjunctive definition.

Although some authors hold that natural kinds are necessarily relative to disciplinary domains, many authors presume that natural kinds must be absolute, categorical features of the reality —often assuming that without even mentioning the alternative. Recognizing both possibilities, one may ask whether the difference especially matters. I argue that it does. Looking at recent arguments about natural kind realism, I argue that we can best make sense of the realism question by thinking of natural kindness as a relation that holds (...) between a category and a domain. (shrink)

Cover songs are a familiar feature of contemporary popular music. Musicians describe their own performances as covers, and audiences use the category to organize their listening and appreciation. However, until now philosophers have not had much to say about them. This book explores how to think about covers, appreciating covers, and the metaphysics of covers and songs. Along the way, it explores a range of issues raised by covers, from the question of what precisely constitutes a cover, to the history (...) and taxonomy of the category, the various relationships that hold between songs, performances, and tracks, and the appreciation and evaluation of covers. (shrink)

It is now commonly held that values play a role in scientific judgment, but many arguments for that conclusion are limited. First, many arguments do not show that values are, strictly speaking, indispensable. The role of values could in principle be filled by a random or arbitrary decision. Second, many arguments concern scientific theories and concepts which have obvious practical consequences, thus suggesting or at least leaving open the possibility that abstruse sciences without such a connection could be value-free. Third, (...) many arguments concern the role values play in inferring from evidence, thus taking evidence as given. This paper argues that these limitations do not hold in general. There are values involved in every scientific judgment. They cannot even conceivably be replaced by a coin toss, they arise as much for exotic as for practical sciences, and they are at issue as much for observation as for explicit inference. (shrink)

William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism and show (...) that it is sometimes permissible to believe in the absence of compelling evidence. However, the two considerations have different scope and force. Doxastic efficacy applies in only some cases but allows any values to play a role in determining belief; risk applies in all cases but only allows particular conditional values to play a role. (shrink)

Homeostatic property clusters (HPCs) are offered as a way of understanding natural kinds, especially biological species. I review the HPC approach and then discuss an objection by Ereshefsky and Matthen, to the effect that an HPC qua cluster seems ill-fitted as a description of a polymorphic species. The standard response by champions of the HPC approach is to say that all members of a polymorphic species have things in common, namely dispositions or conditional properties. I argue that this response fails. (...) Instances of an HPC kind need not all be similar in their exhibited properties. Instead, HPCs should instead be understood as unified by the underlying causal mechanism that maintains them. The causal mechanism can both produce and explain some systematic differences between a kind’s members. An HPC kind is best understood not as a single cluster of properties maintained in stasis by causal forces, but as a complex of related property clusters kept in relation by an underlying causal process. This approach requires recognizing that taxonomic systems serve both explanatory and inductive purposes. (shrink)

We characterise explicitly the decidable predicates on integers of Infinite Time Turing machines, in terms of admissibility theory and the constructible hierarchy. We do this by pinning down ζ, the least ordinal not the length of any eventual output of an Infinite Time Turing machine (halting or otherwise); using this the Infinite Time Turing Degrees are considered, and it is shown how the jump operator coincides with the production of mastercodes for the constructible hierarchy; further that the natural ordinals associated (...) with the jump operator satisfy a Spector criterion, and correspond to the L ζ -stables. It also implies that the machines devised are "Σ 2 Complete" amongst all such other possible machines. It is shown that least upper bounds of an "eventual jump" hierarchy exist on an initial segment. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) and (...) (c) do rely on problematic premises that are no more secure than claims of common sense itself. Yet (b) and (d) do not. This conclusion can be established directly by considering the arguments informally, but one might still worry that there is an implicit premise in them. In order to address this concern, I reconstruct the arguments in the framework of subjective Bayesianism. The worry becomes this: Do the arguments rely on specific values for the prior probability of some premises? Reid's appeals to our prior cognitive and practical commitments do not. Rather than relying on specific probability assignments, they draw on things that are part of the Bayesian framework itself, such as the nature of observation and the connection between belief and action. Contra the theological or reliabilist readings, the defense of common sense does not require indefensible premises. (shrink)

According to the standard narrative, natural kind is a technical notion that was introduced by John Stuart Mill in the 1840s and the recent craze for natural kinds, launched by Putnam and Kripke, is a continuation of that tradition. I argue that the standard narrative is mistaken. The Millian tradition of kinds was not particularly influential in the 20th-century, and the Putnam-Kripke revolution did not clearly engage with even the remnants that were left of it. The presently active tradition of (...) natural kinds is less than half a century old. Recognizing this might help us better appreciate both Mill and natural kinds. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

We represent truth sets for a variety of the well known semantic theories of truth as those sets consisting of all sentences for which a player has a winning strategy in an infinite two person game. The classifications of the games considered here are simple, those over the natural model of arithmetic being all within the arithmetical class of $\Sum_{3}^{0}$.

Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world (...) and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being. (shrink)

Peter Baumann offers the tantalizing suggestion that Thomas Reid is almost, but not quite, a pragmatist. He motivates this claim by posing a dilemma for common sense philosophy: Will it be dogmatism or scepticism? Baumann claims that Reid points to but does not embrace a pragmatist third way between these unsavory options. If we understand `pragmatism' differently than Baumann does, however, we need not be so equivocal in attributing it to Reid. Reid makes what we could call an argument from (...) practical commitment, and this is plausibly an instance of what William James calls the pragmatic method. (shrink)

Part of a book symposium on Anjan Chakravartty's Scientific ontology: integrating naturalized metaphysics and voluntarist epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2017).

P D Walsh; Value Education in a Pluralist Society, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 24–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

Some scientific categories seem to correspond to genuine features of the world and are indispensable for successful science in some domain; in short, they are natural kinds. This book gives a general account of what it is to be a natural kind and puts the account to work illuminating numerous specific examples.

A considerable literature has grown up around the claim of Uniqueness, according to which evidence rationally determines belief. It is opposed to Permissivism, according to which evidence underdetermines belief. This paper highlights an overlooked third possibility, according to which there is no rational doxastic attitude. I call this 'Nihilism'. I argue that adherents of the other two positions ought to reject it but that it might, nevertheless, obtain at least sometimes.

When we ask what natural kinds are, there are two different things we might have in mind. The first, which I’ll call the taxonomy question, is what distinguishes a category which is a natural kind from an arbitrary class. The second, which I’ll call the ontology question, is what manner of stuff there is that realizes the category. Many philosophers have systematically conflated the two questions. The confusion is exhibited both by essentialists and by philosophers who pose their accounts in (...) terms of similarity. It also leads to misreading philosophers who do make the distinction. Distinguishing the questions allows for a more subtle understanding of both natural kinds and their underlying metaphysics. (shrink)

The accepted narrative treats John Stuart Mill’s Kinds as the historical prototype for our natural kinds, but Mill actually employs two separate notions: Kinds and natural groups. Considering these, along with the accounts of Mill’s nineteenth-century interlocutors, forces us to recognize two distinct questions. First, what marks a natural kind as worthy of inclusion in taxonomy? Second, what exists in the world that makes a category meet that criterion? Mill’s two notions offer separate answers to the two questions: natural groups (...) for taxonomy and Kinds for ontology. This distinction is ignored in many contemporary debates about natural kinds and is obscured by the standard narrative that treats our natural kinds just as a development of Mill’s Kinds. (shrink)

An ethical conflict arises when we must perform research in the interest of future patients, but that this may occasionally injure the interests of today''s patients. In the case of cognitively impaired persons, the question arises whether it is compatible with humane healthcare not only to treat, but also to use these patients for research purposes. Some bioethicists and theologians have formulated a general duty of solidarity, also pertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as a justification for research on these persons. (...) If one examines this thesis from the theory of justice according to John Rawls, it is revealed that such a duty of solidarity cannot necessarily be extrapolated from Rawls' conception of justice. This is at least true of Rawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measures are justifiable which serve the interest of the respective least well off. Those measures which would engender additional injury for the least well off could not be balanced by any utility according to Rawls. However, John Rawls' difference principle is subordinate to the first principle, which is that each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the same liberty for others. These primary goods are determined by the freedom and integrity of the person. This integrity of decisionally impaired persons would be in danger if one would abstain from research and thus forego the increase in knowledge related to their disease. Thus one could conclude, at least from Rawls' first principle, that society must take on a duty to guarantee the degrees of freedom for cognitively impaired persons and thus also support the efforts for their healing. (shrink)

First published in 1966. Professor Dryer has furnished a highly illuminating account of Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason _by unfolding its central argument. _Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics _brings out the light which Kant has to throw on central topics of philosophy. It takes its place as an indispensable guide to every student of the _Critique of Pure Reason. _.

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, (...) p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra. (shrink)

This is an open-access introductory logic textbook, prepared by Jonathan Ichikawa, based on P.D. Magnus's forallx. This (v2.0, July 2020) is intended as a stable, ready-for-teaching edition.

Experimental evidence strongly supports the view that the subdivision of organ anlagen into smaller structural units is an autonomous process. Dalcq &Pasteels' hypothesis which says that the boundaries between the different areas into which a morphogenetic field differentiates are determined by “Threshold values” in the “potential” of the field in question, is inconsistent with our present knowledge of biochemical reaction systems. Threshold values may only be used indescribing the spatial differentiation of a morphogenetic field. It is suggested that the latter (...) concept be replaced by the concept of “optimal values” in the intensity of a morphogenetic field-specific for the various chemo-differentiations characterizing the different regions into which a morphogenetic field will split up-and that each optimal value isdeterminative for the appearance of one particular differentiation within the morphogenetic field, each differentiation being formed within a certain range of intensity of the field. On the basis of the hypothesis formulated above a “virginal” morphogenetic field will necessarily differentiate into a number of smaller fields of second order, which in their turn will split up into fields of third order, etc. ” Pattern formation” may be defined as the differentiation of a morphogenetic field into an increasing number of smaller fields of higher order of qualitative different chemical and structural composition. Since differentiation of a morphogenetic field proceeds autonomously, the capacity for pattern formation is an intrinsic property of a morphogenetic field. In the light of these considerations it is suggested that a morphogenetic field action is responsible for the first differentiation of the developing embryo into regions with predominantly ectodermal, mesodermal or endodermal differentiation tendencies. The present knowledge about the characteristic pattern formation taking place in the axial mesoderm as well as in the overlying neural plate seems to be in good agreement with the implications of the present morphogenetic field concept. It is emphasized, however, that if the present morphogenetic field concept cannot be characterized further biochemically and biophysically, it will have to be replaced by another concept which can be defined more sharply and is more easily accessible to experimental analysis. Les preuves expérimentales confirment que la subdivision des ébauches des organes en unités structurelles plus petites est un processus autonome. L'hypothèse deDalcq &Pasteels disant que les bornes entre les différents domaines formées par la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique sont déterminées par des „valeurs seuil” dans le „potentiel” du champ en question, n'est pas en harmonie avec notre connaissance actuelle des systèmes biochimiques. Des “valeurs seuil” ne peuvent être employés qu'en décrivant la différenciation spatiale d'un champ morphogénétique. On prend en considération de remplacer le concept des “valeurs seuil” par le concept des “valeurs optimales” dans l'intensité d'un champ morphogénétique. Ce seraient les valeurs spécifiques aux différenciations chimiques diverses qui caractérisent les différents domaines dans lesquels un champ morphogénétique se différencie. En outre, chaque valeur optimale serait déterminative à la formation d'une différenciation spéciale dans le champ morphogénétique, chaque différentiation se formant dans un certain trajet de l'intensité du champ. Par suite de l'hypothèse formulée ci-dessus un champ morphogénétique “virginal” va nécessairement se différencier en un nombre de champs plus petits de deuxième ordre, qui à leur tour se divisent en champs d'ordre troisième, etc.... La régionalisation peut être définie comme la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique dans un nombre de plus en plus élevé de champs plus petits d'ordre supérieur de composition chimique et structurelle qualitativement différente. Parce que la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique se produit de façon autonome, le pouvoir de régionalisation est une propriété intrinsique d'un champ morphogénétique. Ces considérations nous mènent à proposer que l'action d'un champ morphogénétique est responsable de la première différenciation de l'embryon en régions qui possèdent des tendences de différenciation principalement ectodermiques, mésodermiques, ou bien endodermiques. La connaissance actuelle concernant la régionalisation caractéristique qui se produit dans le mésoderme axial ainsi que dans la plaque neurale superposée paraît se conformer aux conséquences du concept de champ morphogénétique. Cependant on souligne le fait que dans le cas òu le concept actuel du champ morphogénétique ne pourra pas être plus amplement caractérisé de façon biochimique et biophysique, il faudra le remplacer par un autre concept qui puit être défini plus nettement et qui est mieux accessible à l'analyse expérimentale. Die Auffassung, dass die Aufteilung von Organanlagen in kleineren Struktureinheiten ein selbständiger Prozess ist, findet Bestätigung in den experimentellen Ergebnissen. Die Hypothese vonDalcq &Pasteels, dass die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedenen Gebieten, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenziert, durch “Schwellenwerte” im “Potential” des genannten Feldes bestimmt werden, ist unvereinbar mit unserem heutigen Wissen über biochemischen Reaktionssystemen. Der Gebrauch des Begriffs “Schwellenwert” ist nur gestattet bei der Beschreibung der räumlichen Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Statt dieses Begriffs wird der Begriff “Optimaler Wert” vorgeschlagen; Werte also in der Intensität eines morphogenetischen Feldes, optimal und spezifisch für die verschiedene Chemodifferenzierungen, welche die Gebiete kennzeichnen, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenzieren wird. Jeder optimaler Wert soll dann das Erscheinen einer bestimmten Differenzierung innerhalb des morphogenetischen Feldes veranlassen, welche Differenzierung sich bildet innerhalb eines bestimmten Bereichs der Feldintensität. Auf Grund der obigen Hypothese wird ein “virginelles” morphogenetisches Feld zwangsläufig sich differenzieren in eine Anzahl kleinerer Feldern zweiten Grades; diese in Felder dritten Grades, usw. Musterbildung könnte definiert werden als die Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes in eine zunehmende Anzahl kleinerer Felder höheren Grades von qualitativ verschiedener chemischen und strukturellen Zusammensetzung, Weil diese Differenzierung autonom vor sich geht, ist das Vermögen zur Musterbildung eine innewohnende Eigenschaft eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Im Lichte dieser Betrachtungen ist es naheliegend anzunehmen dass eine morphogenetische Feldwirkung verantwortlich ist für die erste Differenzierung des sich entwickelnden Embryos in Gebiete überwiegend ektodermalen, mesodermalen oder entodermalen Differenzierungstendenzen. Die heutigen Kenntnisse über die charakteristische Musterbildung im axialen Teil des Mesoderms und in der überliegenden Neuralplatte scheinen in guter Übereinstimmung zu sein mit den des morphogenetischen Feldbegriffs. Dennoch wird benachdruckt, dass, falls das gegenwärtige morphogenetische Feldbegriff nicht weiter biochemisch und biophysisch gekennzeichnet werden kann, anstatt dessen ein anderer Begriff entwickelt werden muß, der schärfer definiert werden kann und besser zugänglich ist für experimentelle Analyse. (shrink)

The problem of the logic of understanding history is discussed. We propose a model of understanding history as a conversation, which the person thinking about history has with interlocutors (sources) of previous epochs. The epoch is interpreted as a special way of problematizing human's understanding of him (her) self and the world around. At the same time, three gifts — attention, recognition and name — underlie the connection of the historian in conversation with interlocutors (sources) from other eras. They are (...) not given in advance but are results of a struggle for the recognition. In choosing his (her) interlocutor (source), the historian chooses him (her) self. By giving this interlocutor (the source) the opportunity to be heard, the historian, at the same time, receives a gift from the source — the opportunity to express what would otherwise remain unspoken in the historian's own mind. The logic of conversation, designated as transduction, is not the connection through the identification of the beginning and the end of the discourse, which is appropriate and necessary within the speech of each of the conversationalists, but the connection of the beginnings of these discordant discourses among themselves. (shrink)

Livro-texto de introdução à lógica, com (mais do que) pitadas de filosofia da lógica, produzido como uma versão revista e ampliada do livro Forallx: Calgary. Trata-se da versão de 13 de outubro de 2022. Comentários, críticas, correções e sugestões são muito bem-vindos.

Wissenschaft mit Unterschieden: Parodie und Paradies in Margaret Cavendishs The Blazing World (1666). Mit ihrer utopischen Erzählung The Blazing World (1666) ist Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, eine der wenigen Autorinnen der Frühen Neuzeit, die sich sowohl im Feld der Literatur als auch der Naturphilosophie betätigten. Auf den ersten Blick scheint die Welt jenseits des Nordpols, in die die Protagonistin nach gewaltsamer Entführung und Schiffbruch gerät, ein weibliches Wissenschaftsparadies: Nach eilig erfolgter Vermählung mit dem Kaiser regiert sie eigenverantwortlich über die (...) wissenschaftlichen Institutionen ihres Reichs und debattiert mit Bären‐, Vogel‐, Wurmmännern und ähnlichen Hybridwesen über die neuesten wissenschaftlichen Errungenschaften. Bald schon stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass ihre „Wissenschaftler“ denjenigen der englischen Realität sowohl in ihrer blinden Begeisterung für neue Forschungsinstrumente wie in ihrem ermüdenden Austausch von Meinungen und Glaubenssätzen durchaus ähnlich sind. Unterstützung für ihre Kritik und für eigene Forschungs‐ und Schreibprojekte findet die Protagonistin in der Autorin selbst, der Duchess of Newcastle, in deren Welten sich die beiden gemeinsam begeben. Parodie und Satire, die auf zeitgenössische Modetorheiten im Umfeld der Royal Society abzielen, stehen im Fokus des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ebenso wie utopische Perspektiven, die durch die Eröffnung neuer Denkräume entstehen. Auf dem von ironisch kommentierten Fetischen und Hybriderscheinungen gepflasterten Weg dorthin bewegt sich die Erzählung zwischen Realität und Virtualität, Fakten und Fiktionen, kritisiert epistemologische und institutionelle Vorgaben und testet die Grenzen der Geschlechter im neu entstehenden Feld von Wissenschaft und Literatur. Summary: Science With a Difference: Parody and Paradise in Margaret Cavendish's The Blazing World (1666). Margaret Cavendish's The Blazing World (1666) is one of the very few utopian accounts by women in the early modern period. At first sight, the world beyond the North Pole that Cavendish's beautiful heroine enters after surviving abduction and shipwreck seems to offer the utmost in terms of early modern feminine scientific utopias: after the shortest love story in history, the heroine becomes Empress and is given a whole Empire to govern at her pleasure. But soon it turns out that the hybrid creatures of her newly founded scientific communities, bear‐men, bird‐men, worm‐men, and the like are far from utopian truth‐seeking, but, like their earthly counterparts, all too often revel in tedious meaning and believing. The paper will focus on such parodic moments as well as on alternative modes of dealing with science more adequate to the term Paradise. Only with the support of her this‐worldly friend, the Duchess of Newcastle, who also happens to be the author of the story, the Empress can not only improve her utopian state, but also the state of affairs in the real world. On the way, the boundaries between fact and fiction, real and virtual, masculine and feminine, sense and nonsense are continuously tested – reflecting and commenting on early modern fear and fascination of the unknown and the promises of science and technology. (shrink)

Given the fact that many people use Wikipedia, we should ask: Can we trust it? The empirical evidence suggests that Wikipedia articles are sometimes quite good but that they vary a great deal. As such, it is wrong to ask for a monolithic verdict on Wikipedia. Interacting with Wikipedia involves assessing where it is likely to be reliable and where not. I identify five strategies that we use to assess claims from other sources and argue that, to a greater of (...) lesser degree, Wikipedia frustrates all of them. Interacting responsibly with something like Wikipedia requires new epistemic methods and strategies. (shrink)

We analyse the extent of possible computations following Hogarth ([2004]) conducted in Malament–Hogarth (MH) spacetimes, and Etesi and Németi ([2002]) in the special subclass containing rotating Kerr black holes. Hogarth ([1994]) had shown that any arithmetic statement could be resolved in a suitable MH spacetime. Etesi and Németi ([2002]) had shown that some relations on natural numbers that are neither universal nor co-universal, can be decided in Kerr spacetimes, and had asked specifically as to the extent of computational limits there. (...) The purpose of this note is to address this question, and further show that MH spacetimes can compute far beyond the arithmetic: effectively Borel statements (so hyperarithmetic in second-order number theory, or the structure of analysis) can likewise be resolved: Theorem A. If H is any hyperarithmetic predicate on integers, then there is an MH spacetime in which any query ? n H ? can be computed. In one sense this is best possible, as there is an upper bound to computational ability in any spacetime, which is thus a universal constant of that spacetime. Theorem C. Assuming the (modest and standard) requirement that spacetime manifolds be paracompact and Hausdorff, for any spacetime there will be a countable ordinal upper bound, , on the complexity of questions in the Borel hierarchy computable in it. Introduction 1.1 History and preliminaries Hyperarithmetic Computations in MH Spacetimes 2.1 Generalising SADn regions 2.2 The complexity of questions decidable in Kerr spacetimes An Upper Bound on Computational Complexity for Each Spacetime CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but instead as (...) providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and (...) so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories. It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science. (shrink)

It has been over two decades since Miranda Fricker labeled epistemic injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their capacity as a knower. The philosophical literature has proliferated with variants and related concepts. By considering cases in popular music, we argue that it is worth distinguishing a parallel phenomenon of art-interpretive injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their creative capacity as a possible artist. In section 1, we consider the prosecutorial use of rap lyrics in court as (...) a central case of this injustice. In section 2, we distinguish art-interpretive injustice from other categories already discussed in recent literature. In section 3, we discuss the relationship between genre discourse and identity prejudice. The case for recognizing the category of art-interpretive injustice is that it allows one to recognize a class of harms as being importantly related in ways that one would otherwise overlook. (shrink)

We locate winning strategies for various ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -games in the L-hierarchy in order to prove the following: Theorem 1. KP+Σ₂-Comprehension $\vdash \exists \alpha L_{\alpha}\ models"\Sigma _{2}-{\bf KP}+\Sigma _{3}^{0}-\text{Determinacy}."$ Alternatively: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ "there is a β-model of ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}+\text{\hspace{0.17 em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy." The implication is not reversible. (The antecedent here may be replaced with ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\left({\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\right)-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}:\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ instances of Comprehension with only ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ -lightface definable parameters—or even weaker theories.) Theorem 2. KP +Δ₂-Comprehension +Σ₂-Replacement + ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Determinacy. (Here AQI (...) is the assertion that every arithmetical quasi-inductive definition converges.) Alternatively: $\Delta _{3}^{1}{\rm CA}_{0}+{\rm AQI}\nvdash \Sigma _{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy. Hence the theories: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0},\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}-\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Det, ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\mathrm{A}\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{I}$ , and ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ are in strictly descending order of strength. (shrink)

Introduction 1 P. D. Magnus and Jacob Busch 1. Form-driven vs. Content-driven Arguments for Realism 8 Juha Saatsi 2. Optimism about the Pessimistic Induction 29 Sherrilyn Roush 3. Metaphysics between the Sciences and Philosophies of Science 59 Anjan Chakravartty 4. Nominalism and Inductive Generalizations 78 Jessica Pfeifer 5. Models and Scientific Representations 94 Otávio Bueno 6. The Identical Rivals Response to Underdetermination 112 Gregory Frost-Arnold and P. D. Magnus 7. Scientific Representation and the Semiotics of Pictures 131 Laura Perini 8. (...) Philosophy of the Environmental Sciences 155 Jay Odenbaugh 9. Value Judgements and the Estimation of Uncertainty in Climate Modeling 172 Justin Biddle and Eric Winsberg 10. Feminist Standpoint Empiricism: Rethinking the Terrain in Feminist Philosophy of Science 198 Kristen Intemann 11. Naturalism and the Enlightenment Ideal: Rethinking a Central Debate in the Philosophy of Social Science 226 Daniel Steel 12. New Approaches to the Division of Cognitive Labor 250 Michael Weisberg. (shrink)

Sol LeWitt is probably most famous for wall drawings. They are an extension of work he had done in sculpture and on paper, in which a simple rule specifies permutations and variations of elements. With wall drawings, the rule is given for marks to be made on a wall. We should distinguish these algorithmic works from impossible-to-implement instruction works and works realized by following preparatory sketches. Taking the core feature of a wall drawing to be that it is algorithmic, some (...) of LeWitt's later works are wall drawings in name only. (shrink)

A small large cardinal upper bound in V for proving when certain subsets of ω 1 (including the universally Baire subsets) are precisely those constructible from a real is given. In the core model we find an exact equivalence in terms of the length of the mouse order; we show that $\forall B \subseteq \omega_1 \lbrack B$ is universally Baire $\Leftrightarrow B \in L\lbrack r \rbrack$ for some real r] is preserved under set-sized forcing extensions if and only if there (...) are arbitrarily large "admissibly measurable" cardinals. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a (...) gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times. (shrink)

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.